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Volume 1 Fall 2004

A WORLD COURT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?
Stefan Trechsel∗
I.

Introduction
¶ 1 The title of this presentation has a question mark. Indeed, to my knowledge

this is the first time that this issue is being considered, and when one thinks of the
possibility of creating a new world court for human rights, a plethora of questions come
to mind. I had the temerity to accept the task of tackling this subject and to set out some
of the questions that arise. In part I shall attempt to give these various questions some
order so as to determine whether it is justified to explore the foundations on which such
a court would be built. I shall continue with a section speculating as to what a world
court for human rights could look like. In fact, the first and the second question seem to
me to be closely linked; it is very difficult to decide on the creation of a new institution
unless one has relatively specific ideas as to what the institution would be like, in
particular what tasks it ought to fulfill. I will conclude with sketches suggesting how
the court could operate. I have to admit that I am perhaps not very well prepared for
dealing with the subject. Indeed, I teach criminal law and procedure rather than
international public law and human rights. However, for almost twenty-five years I
have been active in the mechanism for the implementation of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR), as a member of the Commission. I was also involved in the
reform of the system which came about with the introduction of Protocol Number 11. It
will be no surprise, then, that my approach may seem somewhat Eurocentric.
II.

The Essential Questions
¶ 2 Without in any way aspiring to completeness, I believe that three specific

questions lie at the core of our subject. First, whether a world court for human rights
(WCHR) would be desirable. Second, whether there is a need for such a court and third,
whether there is a reasonable chance of actually realizing the plan.
A. Is a World Court for Human Rights Desirable?
¶ 3 The first question, then, is whether it would be a good thing to have a world

court for human rights. The answer tends to be an affirmative one, at least if the person
who answers is someone who believes in human rights, the supremacy of law, and the
possibility of conflict-solving through the judicial process. I have always found it
important to make a clear distinction between human rights activists and human rights
lawyers. No need to stress that I would place myself in the second group. Human rights
lawyers know the human rights law and try to apply it in a correct way. Human rights
activists fight for a specific cause to which—rightly or wrongly—they attach the label
“human rights.” They decide themselves whether, in a particular situation, such rights
∗
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are at issue. They fight for individuals, minorities, and causes such as abortion or the
right to life of the unborn children. I would not like to pass a value judgment on these
approaches—in my view both are legitimate and valuable. It is just important not to
mix them up.
¶ 4 I could imagine that human rights activists would not be entirely happy about
a world court for human rights. Such a court would of course not only decide in favor
of those invoking human rights, but also against them, as the case may be. In so doing,
the court would also limit the scope of human rights, possibly in areas where human
rights activists reject the limitation. That aspect of the court’s activity might cause
resentment.
¶ 5 On the other hand, many governments might not regard a world court for

human rights as desirable at all. However, at this stage we ought not to be greatly
influenced by this; in fact, our examination of the possibility of a new world court aims
to find out whether we can gather enough sufficiently convincing arguments in order to
persuade governments to agree to a reform that they do not truly desire. Public opinion
might lead them to overcome such reluctance.
¶ 6 The answer will finally depend on the level of abstraction one intends to

adopt. If one imagines an ideal world, certainly a WCHR is desirable, or an
independent institution, be it a section of the (general) World Court. If one looks at the
world today, one will have very serious doubts. The conflicts which we read about
every day are not of a kind that could be solved by judicial proceedings. Realistically
speaking, I really wonder whether today a WCHR is really desirable, whether it would
be worth the effort.
B. Is There a Need for a World Court for Human Rights?
¶ 7 It is my firm belief that desirability would not, in itself, be a sufficient reason

to justify the creation of a new institution on a universal level. I am rather skeptical
about excessive activism and do not regard it as acceptable to pursue such an important
project unless it can be affirmed that there is a necessity for the new institution, a
pressing social need. It must be shown that there is a need for judicial protection of
human rights on a universal scale. There is already quite an impressive list of bodies
which deal with human rights within the framework of the United Nations. Numerous
committees have been set up under specialized treaties, including the Committee of
Human Rights set up to implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR),1 the U.N. Human Rights Commission,2 and the High Commissioner
for Human Rights.3 In recent times, criminal courts have been created after violent
conflict and massive human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia,4 Rwanda,5 and—
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
U.N. CHARTER, pmbl., arts. 1, 13, 55, 62, 68, 76. (creating the U.N. Human Rights Commission and
inserting into the Charter human rights principals).
3
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights committee documentation is available at
http://www.unhchr.ch.
4
Statute of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
5
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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more recently—Sierra Leone.6 The Rome Statute,7 creating an International Criminal
Court, has entered into force and the judges have been elected.
¶ 8 However, while all these many bodies can be regarded as dealing in one way
or another with the protection of human rights, none can be regarded as a substitute for
a world court for human rights. Either they are not judicial bodies—this applies in
particular to the various commissions and committees—or they are not directly dealing
with human rights issues, which applies to the Criminal Tribunals.8
¶ 9 Of course, there is the International Court of Justice. Currently we have two

regional courts of human rights. There is the Inter-American Court which so far has
produced eighty-five judgments and decisions and sixteen advisory opinions.9 There is
also the European Court of Human Rights which has passed well over a thousand
judgments and, if one adds those taken by the Commission, over forty-thousand
decisions on admissibility.10 Although there is not yet an operating African Court of
Human Rights, all indications suggest that the continent is moving towards creating
such a judicial body.11 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights entered into
force on October 21, 1986.12 Even more encouraging was the adoption on June 9, 1998,
of a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights establishing an
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to supplement the already-existing
commission.13 This protocol will come into force when fifteen of the States have
ratified it; currently only eleven States have done so.14 Neither Asia nor the Pacific
region has any comparable institution—there we do not even find a convention on
human rights.
6

Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
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William Schabas, The Relationship between Truth Commissions and International Courts: The Case of
Sierra Leone, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 1035 (2003).
7
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9
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10
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11
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12
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on June 27, 1981, came into force on Oct.
21, 1986, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
13
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights signed in Uagadougou, Burkina Faso,
at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on June
9, 1998, OAU Doc. LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT./rev. 2 (1997). The text, which is exactly the same as the
Draft Protocol, appears in Ibrahim Ali Badawi El-Sheikh, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, 9
AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 943 (1997).
14
As of Aug. 19, 2003 the following countries had ratified the Protocol: Algeria (April 22, 2003);
Burkina Faso (Dec. 31, 1998); Burundi (April 2, 2003); Gambia (June 30, 1999); Ivory Coast (Jan. 7,
2003); Mali (May 10, 2000); Rwanda (May 5, 2003); Senegal (Sept. 29, 1998); South Africa (July 3,
2002); Togo (June 23, 2003) and Uganda (Feb. 16, 2001). Up-to-date information as to the state of
ratifications can be found at the website of the Commission, at http://www.achpr.org. See also JeanBernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. L. J. 149, 156
(2001).

¶ 10 It would be tempting to conclude that, as a court of human rights exists on
the regional level, there ought to be a similar institution on a global level, a parallel, as
it were, to the regional and world treaties. I regard it as premature to make a statement
at this point as to whether the argument for necessity has been made out. Next, I want
to turn to a very pragmatic question: is there a chance for a world court of human rights
to come into existence?

C. Does a World Court for Human Rights Stand a Chance?
¶ 11 I confess that I have rather serious doubts as to whether, at the present time,
the idea of creating a new world court for human rights stands much of a chance. The
United States, after the horrible attacks of September 11, is focusing on a “war against
terrorism.” In the Middle East, it seems that violence is regarded as the only approach
to the Palestinian problem—the United States seems to continue its support for Mr.
Sharon. Russia welcomes this trend in its struggle to keep Chechnya within the
Federation. Violence did not put an end to violence in Iraq. Despite the departure of
Charles Taylor, Liberia seems far from appeased. One is tempted to ask which powers
actually care about human rights. China? Australia in its approach to refugees?
¶ 12 It is true that the International Criminal Court receives much support notwithstanding the negative attitude of the United States. However, I do not think that this
experience can be compared to the issue of a world court of human rights. For one,
there were the very massive violations of human rights in various areas of the world
including, but not limited to, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. The
atrocities committed called for an answer in criminal law. Those who decided to create
the International Criminal Court were convinced that this court would be called upon to
try others, individual villains. Most of the States approving the court very probably
thought that it would not be used to try their nationals and, if so, were prepared to
dissociate themselves from such criminals even if they were in possession of their
passport.
¶ 13 A court of human rights is an entirely different matter. Here, the defendants
are not individuals but States. Back in 1950, when the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms15 was adopted, the High Contracting Parties were
convinced that this would be of little relevance to themselves. Experience has shown
that this was an error. Sweden, to take but one example, was particularly self-satisfied
for many years. Suddenly, an application was brought by Mr. Sporrong and Mrs.
Lönnroth.16 The Commission and Court came to the conclusion that a number of
fundamental rights had been violated.17 This triggered a long series of applications
regarding the lack of judicial protection in administrative matters; later on there came a
series of allegations, not all of them ill-founded, regarding unjustified interferences by
the State with the right to respect for family life, and many more followed.
¶ 14 It can be assumed that these developments have not gone unnoticed. Today,
States will be aware of the fact that none of them are immune from allegations of
violations of fundamental rights. The process of being publicly accused of having
violated human rights is something that States wholeheartedly dislike. They may,
today, be much more reluctant to agree to submit to such a system of control.
15

European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Swed., 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 52 (1982).
17
Id.
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¶ 15 Furthermore, countries adhering to a regional system may see little purpose
in joining an additional universal one; this objection, however, does not seem to be
particularly strong. In fact, most of the countries that are party to the European
Convention of Human Rights have also ratified the U.N. Covenant and have even
accepted the possibility of individual communications under the Protocol.18 The
justification for this extra protection cannot lie in the operation of the system for the
country; however, it must be seen as a step which demonstrates solidarity with
countries in other parts of the world which participate in the universal system. The
same reason might work with regard to a WCHR.
¶ 16 Yet, the European experience is not entirely encouraging if one looks at the
European Union. For many years now there has been discussion as to whether the E.U.
should ratify the ECHR.19 It would certainly be very warmly welcomed by the Council
of Europe. The European Court of Justice, however, gave an advisory opinion stating
that this would presuppose an amendment to the treaty.20 So far, no such amendment
has been adopted; although recently it seems to have come under serious consideration.
The Union has recently adopted a Charter of Fundamental Rights21 which was
elaborated on by a prestigious “Convention.” However, this Charter was given the form
of a mere Declaration. No mechanism of implementation has been adopted.
¶ 17 Finally, on an even more practical level, it should be kept in mind that an

international court is a rather expensive affair. Actually, lack of resources is one of the
main problems of the European Court of Human Rights. The United Nations, like the
Council of Europe and contrary to the European Union, is not exactly a model of
prosperity. It may be difficult to convince States to pay further contributions to an
international organization in view of the fact that the criminal tribunal will already be a
rather costly affair.

18

Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on Oct. 16,
1966, entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302. For a list of countries which have made a
declaration regarding Article 41 see Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human
Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. L. J. 111, 118 (2002).
19
See, e.g., Bultrini, L’interaction entre le Système de la CEDH et le Système Communautaire, in 4
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN 493-504 (1998); Clapham, Human Rights and the
European Community: A Critical Overview 1991, in 1 EUROPEAN UNION: THE HUMAN RIGHTS
CHALLENGE (Cassese et al. eds., 1991); A. Drzemczewski, The Internal Application of the European
Human Rights Convention as European Community Law, 30 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 118 (1981); P.
Drzemczewski, The Council of Europe’s Position with Respect to the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. L. J. 14 (2001); Jacque, The Convention and the European Communities, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Macdonald et al. eds., 1993); KUTSCHER,
DER GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IM EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT (1982); LECLERC, L’UNION
EUROPÉENNE ET LES DROIT FONDAMENTAUX (1999); MENDELSON, THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1984);
Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human Rights, Y.B. EUR. L. 121 (1981); MOSLER,
GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IN EUROPA (1976); Perspectives of an All-European System of Human Rights
Protection: The Role of the Council of Europe, the CSCE, and the European Communities, 1 ALL-EUR.
HUM. RTS. Y.B. (Kędzia et. al. eds., 1991); TAVERNIER, QUELLE EUROPE POUR LES DROITS DE
L’HOMME? LA COUR DE STRASBOURG ET LA RÉALISATION D’UNE “UNION PLUS ÉTROITE” (35 années de
jurisprudence: 1959-1994) (1996); Toth, The European Union and Human Rights: The Way Forward, 34
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 491 (1997); Weiler & Lockhard, Taking Rights Seriously: The European Court
of Justice and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 51, 579 (1995).
20
Opinion 02/94, Accession by the Cmty. to European Convention for the Prot. of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. I-01759.
21
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.

¶ 18 At the end of this first chapter, I leave the question mark and even print it
bold. Although it does not seem premature to say that the case for a WCHR is a rather
weak one and the prospects of creating such an institution are bleak, let us now
examine what a WCHR could look like.

III.

What Kind of a Court?

¶ 19 I do not think that there is any chance of “selling” a WCHR unless one
gives the product a shape and constructs a model of what such a court would actually
look like. Let us not forget that the International Association for Penal Law and the
International Law Association had been working on draft statutes for an International
Criminal Court many years before the impetus started that led to the adoption of the
Rome Statute.22 The possibilities I wish to explore, again, without pretending that this is
definitive, include the status of the court, its competence, its proceedings and its
relationship to other institutions.

A. The Status of the Court
¶ 20 I can imagine three different models, as far as the status of the court is

concerned: a sibling to the ICJ; a court in its own right like the ICC; and a court as the
top part of a world-wide judicial pyramid. For simplicity I shall call them the “Sibling
Model,” the “ICC-Model,” and the “Pyramid Model.”
1. The Pyramid Model
¶ 21 Some twenty-years ago, in a lecture on “[h]uman rights in the twenty-first
century,”23 I already ventured to propose a world court for human rights. I am a
recidivist on this subject. The idea corresponds to what I now call the “Pyramid
Model.” The idea was that the system of regional instruments for the protection of
human rights ought to be expanded throughout the whole world. In particular, the
African, American, and European models ought to be followed in Asia and the Pacific
region, including Australia. It goes without saying that the regional systems gradually
ought to be assimilated to each other on the European standard. The role of the WCHR
would be to ensure a uniform interpretation of the world human rights law. On the
“substantive side” there would have to be codification of the world human rights law
which would take as a starting point the international covenants, in particular the
ICCPR, adjusting it here and there, as the case may be, with elements taken from
regional instruments. The world court, in other words, would be an ultimate court of
appeals.

¶ 22 This model is certainly not a short-term project. I guess it might take thirty
to fifty-years to realize, as it is meant to grow from the bottom up. If the construction
could successfully be done, it would be a relatively solid and simple model. But it is so
far-reaching that I find it difficult to discuss it in any detail. I seem to understand that
the present conference is a modern one in the sense that it is built on impatience rather
than patience. A flaw in the “Pyramid Model” might also be its “straightness.” It
follows the plan of organic and harmonic growth. Yet, in the theory of economic
22

Rome Statute, supra note 7.
Stefan Trechsel, International Implementation of Human Rights in the 21st Century, KEIO L. REV. 121
(1993).

23

development, an interesting theory was put forward by Albert O. Hirschman in the
middle of the last century: the model of unbalanced growth.24 In order to get ahead it
may often be preferable not to go step-by-step but to go too far in one sector, so that
there is an incentive for other sectors to follow suit. It is from this perspective that I
shall examine the two other models.
2. The ICC Model
¶ 23 One could envisage the creation of a world court for human rights on the
model of the ICC. After appropriate preparative work, an international conference
would be called, such as that which was held in Rome. A statute would be adopted
which would enter into force after a certain number of ratifications had been obtained.
This might have the advantage of containing the opposition against such a court. There
would be no requirement of a two-thirds majority.25 The statute could enter into force
for a certain number of states willing to submit to international jurisdiction in the area
of human rights. That court would, however, be an “international” rather than a
“World” Court.

3. The Sibling Model
¶ 24 Finally, the WCHR could be built in accordance with the model of the ICJ.

This would require an amendment to the Charter of the United Nations. It could be a
very tortuous and difficult road as a two-thirds majority would be required. On the
other hand, however, this road would provide the highest authority for a human rights
court, authority that might be dearly needed.
¶ 25 The following discussion will be based on the Sibling Model, although

there would not be considerable differences if the ICC Model were chosen.
B. The Competencies of the World Court for Human Rights
1. Ratione personae
¶ 26 The competence of a court ratione personae can be divided into active and
passive aspects. The active aspect answers the question regarding who would be able to
take a matter to the court. The passive aspect asks who could be a defendant.

a) The active aspect
¶ 27 Who should be entitled to bring applications alleging violations of human
rights before the world court? Various options must be examined.
¶ 28 First, the natural answer in an international setting would be that States and
only States have the right to apply to the world court. This is the procedure with regard
to the ICJ. It would, therefore, seem to be the appropriate answer if one were to opt for
the “sibling to the ICJ-model.”
¶ 29 However, experience makes me skeptical as to the soundness of this

proposal. One might expect that the inter-state application as an instrument of collective
responsibility for the collective protection of human rights would be put to use.
24
25

ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, 4 THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1958).
Compare U.N. CHARTER art. 108.

However, this has happened only rarely. During the first fifty-one years of the existence
of the European inter-state model, only nineteen such applications were brought.26 If
one looks at them more closely, it turns out that with the exception of three cases, the
background of the application was always a serious conflict between the applicant and
the defendant State; this applies to the two applications brought in 1956 by Greece
against the United Kingdom in connection with Cyprus;27 to the application of Austria
v. Italy28 concerning problems in the Southern Tyrol; to Ireland v. United Kingdom;29
and to the applications brought by Cyprus against Turkey.30 The exceptions are two
applications brought by four countries against Greece during the Colonels’ regime
established in 196731 and the application brought by five countries against Turkey after
the military had taken over in 1982.32 Finally, there is the application brought by
Denmark against Turkey,33 which concerned the case of a Danish journalist who had
been imprisoned and which lies between the two poles.
¶ 30 One specific feature of these applications must be mentioned: They have
demonstrated that States are not always very diligent applicants when they act merely
in the public interest.34
¶ 31 I am prepared to accept that on the universal level there are considerably

more problems between States which could lead to a larger number of inter-state
applications. Still, I am afraid that restricting access to the court to States would not
justify the creation of such an institution. Article 41 of the ICCPR sets out a provision
permitting inter-state applications.35 This is an optional clause and only permits
applications where a State has expressly and separately stated its willingness to comply
with the article. By the end of 2001, forty-seven of 144 member-states had signed
Article 41.36 The effectiveness (or otherwise) of this procedure is aptly described by
Alston and Steiner who, in 2000, state that, “no inter-state application has ever been
brought under any of the U.N. based treaty procedures.”37 The American Convention on
Human Rights also provides an optional clause for the possibility of an inter-state
procedure in Article 45,38 however, to date only ten member-states have signed this.39
26

P. VAN DIJK AND G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (3rd ed. 1998).
27
Greece v. UK, App. no 299/57, 2 YB 186 (1957); Greece v. UK, report of 5 Nov. 1969, Yearbook XII
(1969).
28
Aus. v. Italy, 1963 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 740 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.).
29
Ir. v. U. K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
30
Cyprus v. Turk., App. no. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1976) (Comm. Rep.); Cyprus v.
Turk, App. no. 8007/77, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 85, 146 (1978).
31
Den., Nor., & Swed. v. Greece, App. no. 4448/70, 13 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 108 (Eur. Comm’n of
H.R. (1970)).
32
Fr., Nor., Den., Swed. & Neth. v. Turk., App. no. 9940/82, 1983 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 1 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R.).
33
Den. v. Turk., App. no. 34382/97, 2000 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Hudoc.htm.
34
Bound by the obligation of secrecy, I cannot be more specific.
35
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 41, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
36
This is correct as of Jan. 1, 2002. See Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to
Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. L. J. 111, 117 (2002).
37
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 776 (2d ed. 2000).
38
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 45, July 8, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
39
See Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. L. J. 111,
118 (2002). The member states are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

¶ 32 The other extreme would consist of following the examples of the InterAmerican40 and European Conventions,41 where we find the right to individual
applications. Here the recent European experience must serve as a warning. In fact, for
quite a number of years now there has been a steady and alarming increase in
applications each year. At present, more than sixty-five thousand applications are
pending before the Court.42 Efforts are being made to reform the system so as to reduce
the back-log and process the avalanche of incoming applications. However, this is a
very difficult task if one is not prepared to drastically limit the practical scope of the
right to individual applications. I do not envisage a world court for human rights with a
right to individual applications as being practically reasonable.
¶ 33 Could there be an intermediary solution? It seems to me that at least this

terrain ought to be explored. The States’ right to apply would remain the backbone of
the system. In addition, the right might be granted to certain institutions of the United
Nations. One might think of the Human Rights Committee. I would be very hesitant,
because this has been clearly shown to be a political organ to which no judicial
functions ought to be entrusted.
¶ 34 One might give the right to file applications to the Commissioner for

Human Rights. This could be an efficient instrument, but it would lie in the hands of a
single person. It is true that there is also one single public prosecutor entitled to indict
war criminals before international criminal courts and tribunals. On the other hand, this
concerns actions against individuals and not against States. I rather doubt whether
States would be prepared to vest so much power in one official. One might also
consider the Secretary General of the United Nations or the Security Council, but these
are necessarily even more political than the Human Rights Commission.
¶ 35 To enlarge the competence of the WCHR, one could also grant the right to
apply to international organizations such as the European Union or the Organization of
American States. However, the probability that such institutions would act usefully as
plaintiffs is even more doubtful than is the case in relation to State parties.
¶ 36 What I would regard as an interesting possibility would be to grant a right
of petition to a limited number of non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty
International, the International Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, or the
International Commission of Jurists. If that road were further explored, strict criteria
ought to be established for an international non-governmental organization (“NGO”) to
be included in the list of those permitted to apply. I see a considerable danger in this
variant. Individuals could approach the organizations and implore them to bring
applications in their case. They might write to several or all NGOs who are able to
apply. There would then be a problem of coordination. Also, the NGOs would probably
have to develop some sort of rules as to which cases they would take to the WCHR. In
effect, they might, as private organizations, assume a role similar to that of the
European Commission of Human Rights during its existence. I confess that I do not
regard such a mixed set-up for the world-wide protection of human rights as very
desirable.
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¶ 37 I think that the problem of who should have the right to apply to the WCHR
might be one of the most difficult problems to be solved. Either the list is too narrow
and the court might risk being under-occupied as was the case for the ICJ for a long
time; or it is too broad and there is a risk of the system spiraling out of control, as is the
case in Strasbourg today.

b) The passive aspect
¶ 38 Who should have locus standi as a defendant before the WCHR? Again, the
first and obvious answer is: States. However, it might be worthwhile considering
whether the list ought to be extended. In particular, the question arises whether
international organizations should be included. For very many years, there has been a
lively discussion as to whether the European Union should ratify the European
Convention on Human Rights.43 The Council of Europe has always held the view that
this would be the best solution.44 I cannot expand on this, but it seems rather obvious to
me that the issue ought at least to be thoroughly examined in the context of the creation
of a world court for human rights. The same might apply to NATO. I wish to recall that
the European Court of Human Rights has rejected an application—Bankovic—against a
number of High Contracting Parties.45 The complaint concerned the bombing of RTS
Belgrade. In a very elaborate and learned reasoning, the Court declared the application
inadmissible because the defendant-States had not exercised their jurisdiction.46 With
due respect, while the legal arguments may look convincing, it is hard to understand
why a State should be able to kill people abroad by dropping bombs and then escape
responsibility for the violation of the most valuable human right—the right to life—
under the pretence that it did not exercise jurisdiction.
¶ 39 In a more visionary perspective, one could imagine a further extension. It is

a fact that nowadays enormous power lies with the largest economic entities. I do not
only think of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but also of the
largest corporations such as Nestlé, Coca-Cola, General Motors, British Petroleum,
Phillip Morris or Mitsubishi. Of course, specific and detailed criteria would have to be
established in order to identify those corporations which could be a target for
applications to a world court for human rights. I would hardly hesitate to say that, as far
as the substance is concerned, such an innovation would be entirely justified. One
cannot seriously doubt the fact that multinational corporations have an enormous
amount of power which in many ways is likely to interfere with human rights. On the
other hand, however, I wish to state that I do not regard the prospect of expanding the
competence of the court we are discussing to that field as particularly realistic.
2. Ratione materiae
¶ 40 When we speak about a world court of human rights, we also have to

specify what we mean by “human rights.” Again, a number of options present
themselves. There is the possibility of taking the U.N. Covenants of 1966, at least the
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second one regarding civil and political rights.47 However, even here some caution is
indicated. I am thinking of Article 1, which we also find in the first Covenant,48 which
guarantees the right to self-determination. I have very serious doubts as to whether this
right can be regarded as justiciable. Let us take the example of the so-called “TRNC,”
the Turkish part of the Island of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots discuss the issue of selfdetermination but agree that such a right could hardly be enforced by an international
body.49 A “people” which is not a State will find it difficult to be accepted as an
applicant at all. The main problem of the “TRNC” is the fact that, with the exception of
Turkey, no State has recognized it. The “TRNC,” therefore, leads the life of a phantom
state, only marginally independent of Turkey. Could it be for a world court to decide on
their status, to disentangle the problems of this island?50 I have the most serious doubts,
especially considering that recognition is mainly a political act.51
¶ 41 At any rate, nowadays it would hardly be acceptable to limit the notion of

human rights to the civil and political rights of the Second Covenant. There is no reason
to exclude totally and from the outset the economic, social and cultural rights of the
First Covenant. Furthermore, in my view, racial discrimination, religious
discrimination, discrimination against women, the rights of the child, the prohibition of
torture, etc., should all be included in the special instrument.
¶ 42 One of the particularly difficult questions is the issue of justiciability to

which I have already referred. It arises particularly in the context of the First Covenant.
Does it make sense to have the court decide whether, for example, the right to work,52
the right of assistance to the family,53 or the right to enjoy and mental health,54 have
been violated? I confess that the answer, in my view, ought to be in the negative.
However, it would be going far too far if one were simply to exclude social rights.55
The European Court of Human Rights has quite rightly pointed out that it is not
possible to draw a sharp line between those two categories of fundamental rights.56 One
might be tempted to leave it to the court to solve the problem case-by-case. However,
while this might lead to acceptable results, provided the judges are human rights
lawyers rather than human rights activists, I see very serious problems with the
“consumers” of human rights. The unemployed could, on reading the relevant texts,
expect that the court should ensure that they be able to find remunerated work. I fear
that the resulting disappointment could have a very negative effect on the reputation of
the court. When establishing the statute of a world court of human rights it would
therefore be necessary to identify the rights whose violation could be alleged in judicial
proceedings. This might be rather complicated if it consisted of references to various
human rights instruments. It might, therefore, be worthwhile to envisage a proper
codification of universally recognized human rights—a comprehensive code which
would make a clear distinction between rights which could be invoked before the world
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court and others which could not. Among the rights to be excluded would be those set
out, inter alia, in Article 1 of both Covenants.
3. Ratione loci
¶ 43 There should be no limitations on the competence of the court ratione

loci—whenever an entity which has locus standi as a defendant before the court
exercises its jurisdiction, the court may decide on the alleged violations of human
rights. Thus, Turkey is responsible for human rights violations in the North of Cyprus.57
4. Ratione temporis
¶ 44 As far as the competence of the court—ratione temporis—is concerned, I
see no specific problems. The issue is, however, far from simple—problems arise
especially with regard to proceedings which commenced before the entry into force of
the law but which were ongoing and which thus constituted a “continuing situation.”
The issue has been dealt with in a number of decisions and academic papers in relation
to the ECHR.58 I see no reason to elaborate in the present context.
¶ 45 It would also be recommendable to introduce a time-limit within which an

application must be brought, e.g., six months after the event complained of. Otherwise
it must be expected that the court will be abused in order to regulate disputes of a
historical character. The European Commission of Human Rights had to deal with quite
a number of such allegations, e.g., after the accession of the former communist
European countries.59
C. Proceedings
1. Principle
¶ 46 As a matter of principle, the proceedings of the world court for human
rights, at least if one adopts the “sibling model,” should follow those of the
International Court of Justice with a few exceptions.

2. Fact-Finding
¶ 47 It might be necessary to establish a special commission of inquiry to

establish the facts in cases where they are contested. The European experience has
shown that such fact-finding may be rather difficult and onerous. It may be necessary to
go to the area where the violation is alleged to have taken place and where the
witnesses can be found. Specific rules must be adhered to; the delegates of the
Commission often made up the rules ad hoc following the judicial tradition of their own
background and precedents in earlier missions of inquiry. It would be preferable if the
world court established regulations in advance.
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¶ 48 One may doubt whether it would be justified to have, from the outset, a
permanent instrument of inquiry. It might be preferable to establish rules which, as the
case might arise, would regulate the formation of ad hoc units. This could be a
procedure similar to that used in order to select judges ad litem for the ICTY, i.e., a
number of personalities with appropriate skills could be appointed and trained, while
they would only be actually named ad hoc for specific missions.60

3. Advisory Opinions
¶ 49 In human rights issues, the scope for advisory opinions is somewhat limited.

The European Court has no such practice at all. I do not always find the opinions of the
Inter-American Court convincing and the same applies to the “general comments”
produced by the International Committee for Human Rights.
¶ 50 The problem lies in the fact that very often the details of a specific case
determine the outcome of the proceedings. Cases like the “death-on-the-rock” case61
concerning the killing of three suspected terrorists in Gibraltar by members of the
United Kingdom SAS, or the killing of Lefteris and Elsi in the case of Andronicou and
Constantinou v. Cyprus62 are striking examples. Put in more theoretical terms: There
are matters which can be dealt with in an advisory opinion. For instance, it would be
possible for a court to state that the time within which an arrestee must be brought
before a judge cannot exceed three days except in the case of technical impossibility.
However, it might not be advisable for the court to say that criminal or civil
proceedings may not exceed a length of so and so many months or years. It might be
wise, if one does allow for advisory opinions, to give the court wide discretion to
decide whether a question is fit to be answered in such an opinion.
¶ 51 The statute of the International Court of Justice has special rules setting out

who is entitled to ask for an advisory opinion.63 In particular, this includes bodies
authorized “by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request.”64 If the right to appeal to the court were to be limited to States, such an
extension might be envisaged for advisory opinions.
4. Provisional Measures
¶ 52 Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Statute65 provides for provisional measures

and in LaGrand66 the ICJ decided that these measures are obligatory, legally binding. I
would strongly suggest that the same power ought to be given to the world court of
human rights. I must add that this is by no means an easy matter. In the European
theatre, both the Commission and the Court adopted rules on this issue in their rules of
procedure.67 They gave themselves the competence to draw the attention of respondent
60
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governments to applications where some irreparable danger was threatening.68 They
concerned primarily cases of foreigners about to be expelled or extradited to countries
in which they risked ill-treatment or unlawful killing.69 The Commission or the Court
would indicate to the parties “any interim measure the adoption of which seems
desirable in the interest of the parties for the proper conduct of the proceedings before
it.”70 As you may know, in the case of Cruz Varas v. Sweden,71 the Court, contrary to
the Commission and by a tiny margin of ten votes to nine, decided that disregard of
such an indication did not constitute a violation of the State’s duty not to interfere with
the exercise of the right of petition. When the mechanism of implementation of the
European Convention underwent fundamental reform—the reform which finally took
the form of Additional Protocol Number 11,72 abolishing the Commission and
establishing a full-time Court—the issue of interim measures was also raised. Only two
governments were prepared to even consider such a rule. It would have introduced a
supra-natural element in the powers of the Court and affected the character of the
protective mechanism as such. It might not be easy to convince States on a world level
to accept a similar clause, although the ICJ has for the first time in LaGrand73 affirmed
the binding character of provisional measures ordered under Article 41 of its Statute.74
Indeed, and probably under the influence of the LaGrand judgment, the European Court
of Human Rights has changed its case law and declared “injunctions” under Rule 39 of
the Rules of the Court to be obligatory.75
5. The Execution of Judgments
¶ 53 Let me finally approach the issue of the execution of judgments. This is a

matter which does not really belong to the sphere of the judiciary but to that of the
executive. In the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers is charged with the
supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments. It does so mainly by asking the
States concerned for information until it gets satisfactory answers which allow it to take
a resolution according to which no further steps must be taken in the matter.76 By and
large, all judgments of the Court have been executed; although this was not always easy
or speedy. For instance, after the Marckx v. Belgium77 judgment, which found a
violation due to the unsatisfactory status Belgian law granted to children born out of
wedlock, it took no less than ten-years as well as a second similar application to bring
68
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about a change in the legislation.78 In the case of Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis
Andreadis v. Greece,79 the Court awarded compensation for confiscation and
expropriation amounting to some thirty-million dollars. It took a long time to persuade
the government concerned to execute this judgment, in particular as the applicant was
anything but politically popular—he had in-fact collaborated with the Colonels’
Regime between 1967-1974.80 At present, a very difficult matter is unsolved; it
concerns the case of Loizidou v. Turkey,81 where a compensation of roughly onemillion dollars is now due. The problem lies in the fact that some 580 analogous cases
are currently pending before the Court.82 They all concern property in the northern part
of Cyprus to which access is denied due to the fact that the owners live in the Southern
part of the island. It is of crucial importance to a court that its judgments are honored.
Therefore, it would be necessary to regulate in a solid manner the execution of the
judgments of a world court for human rights.
IV. The Relations Between the World Court of Human Rights and Other
Institutions
A. The WCHR and the ICJ
¶ 54 If one follows the “Sibling Model,” the relationship between the WCHR
and the ICC will be that of two parallel bodies of equal status. One could even imagine
the courts being closely connected on an organizational level. For instance, they could
have one administrative body of support, one registry. They could transfer cases to each
other if they were brought to the institution which is not competent to deal with the
matter.
¶ 55 The “ICC-Model” and the “Pyramid Model” would not allow for such a

close link, but equality would also be required—it would not be compatible with the
concept of a WCHR to have an appeal from its decisions and judgments to the ICJ.
B. The WCHR and the ICC
¶ 56 The relationship between the WCHR and the ICC is a more difficult issue.
The question is whether there ought to be a possibility of appeal from the ICC to the
WCHR alleging violations of human rights, e.g., by conditions and formalities of
deprivation of liberty or disregard for the rules of fair proceedings. The Statute of the
ICC was certainly not drafted with such a possibility in mind. It might make its
proceedings more complicated and somewhat diminish its authority if it were under the
“supervision” of a WCHR. On the other hand, the same standards ought to apply to the
ICC as to national criminal tribunals. It would certainly not be acceptable if the
standards of the ICC were lower. If one thinks ahead and imagines a Constitution of the
United Nations, one could compare the ICC with a supreme court, while the WCHR
would correspond to a constitutional court. The possibility of an appeal to a
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constitutional court against a decision of a supreme court, as in Germany, is not
excluded, although different solutions are certainly possible.
C. The WCHR and the “Treaty Bodies”
¶ 57 There can be no doubt that the WCHR would stand above the “Treaty
Bodies” set up under various Conventions and Covenants. Here, however, a different
problem arises: One could imagine an alternative or a cumulative competence. The
alternative would mean that the court would only be accessible where a specialized
body is not available. This would be hardly acceptable. In fact, it must be assumed that
protection by the WCHR would be more valuable than that of a mere committee. It
would not make any sense to reserve this protection for cases where the “weaker
protection” is not available.
¶ 58 It would be more logical to opt for the opposite subsidiary: Treaty Bodies
would only remain competent in cases not covered by the court—mainly for individual
application, if one follows the proposals made here.
¶ 59 One might want to consider cumulative competence in the sense that the
WCHR would become something like a second instance on the world level. The Treaty
Bodies would then always be the first remedy. This would give them a position similar
to that which the European and American Commissions of Human rights held or hold.
Thus, the proceedings would certainly not be streamlined. However, the WCHR might
see its work considerably facilitated by this variant. One might, if one were to pursue
this approach, consider whether it would be preferable to merge the various bodies into
a single one. However, this might be difficult in view of the fact that the list of States
having ratified the different Conventions is not uniform.

D. The WCHR and Regional Courts of Human Rights
¶ 60 Finally, what would the relation between the WCHR and courts like the

American or European Courts of Human Rights be? This question is, of course, best
answered under the “Pyramid Model.” Here, the WCHR would be the ultimate court of
appeals. It might be given the right to decide freely on which applications it would be
prepared to hear—the rules might be modeled after those of the U.S. Supreme Court.83
¶ 61 With the other models we come upon a considerable difficulty. I have the

most serious doubts as to whether the Europeans would be prepared to accept, at the
time being, any “supervision” by a WCHR. There would be great hesitations because it
would be feared that world standards would be considerably lower than the European
ones. The same might apply for the Inter-American Court, although I do not feel
competent to make any comment on this part of the world.
V.

Concluding Remarks
¶ 62 I started off by asking whether there was a need for a world court for human

rights. In this context, I have also addressed the question of whether the idea stood a
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fair chance of realization. I have then discussed a number of features of the new court.
Let me now return to the initial question.
¶ 63 One essential point has not been discussed so far: It is the question of the
effectiveness of a possible world court for human rights. I wonder if finally this is not
the essential issue. For one, I would suggest that it is only worth having a world court
for human rights if that court is established in a way which can guarantee its effective
operation. It is preferable not to have a world court for human rights at all than to have
a half-hearted patched-up institution with insufficient competence and feeble authority.
The world court for human rights would only be effective if its judgments would
actually be honored. These judgments might be limited to finding a violation as is the
case for the European Court. Still, there is in Europe a mechanism of implementation
which clearly goes beyond making sure that compensation is actually paid to the
victims.
¶ 64 Has the European system been a success? To a large extent I would not
hesitate to answer in the affirmative. But there are a number of limitations. For many
years now very serious violations of human rights continue in Turkey despite a large
number of judgments of the Court.84 As to the Cyprus v. Turkey case,85 it is difficult to
identify any positive result. Perhaps the fact that all investigations and findings in this
problem area were made against Turkey gives a somewhat distorted image of the whole
situation with an unfair advantage to the Greek Cypriot side. Even if Turkey is to be
blamed for not having brought applications against the other side, the situation remains
unsatisfactory and the court proceedings did not contribute to a solution.
¶ 65 There have been applications against Russia in relation to the war in
Chechnya.86 Can we seriously expect those proceedings to be effective?
¶ 66 On a less dramatic level: With regard to Italy there have been hundreds and
hundreds of judgments and decisions finding a violation of the right to a speedy trial,
but still no effective improvement has materialized.
¶ 67 On the other hand, there have, of course, been very many—indeed an

overwhelming majority—of successful cases which led to amendments of the
legislation in most Member States.87 Still, this is Europe, a relatively peaceful corner of
the world.
¶ 68 I am particularly worried about the execution of judgments on the universal
level. What should the consequences be, if, to take an example which is fully detached
from reality, state “A” has filed an application against state “B” alleging widespread
torture and the court has found this allegation to be justified. Let us further assume that
execution is within the competence of the Security Council. There will, in a first phase,
be negotiations. The government of state “B” will be asked what it intends to do about
this problem. Its answer will again be assessed by the Security Council which may find
84
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it to be satisfactory. Country “B” may have an elaborate and convincing program to
fight torture, i.e., by creating a body authorized to visit all places of detention; by
granting generous compensation to victims of torture; by establishing effective means
of investigating all allegations of torture; by enforcing severe penal and administrative
sanctions against officials having been found guilty of torture.
¶ 69 Maybe, however, state “B” does not respond or refuses to take any action,

alleging that torture is necessary in the fight against terrorism. In this case, sanctions
would have to apply. This is not entirely satisfactory because if the sanctions are of an
economic character they might increase the suffering of those who suffer anyway,
including those who are the most likely victims of torture. This is what seems to have
happened, for example, in Iraq. What more can be done? Certainly, no one would
seriously envisage actions such as those taken in the Kosovo conflict. Neither has the
war on Iraq brought very convincing results so far. I think you will agree that here we
reach something like a dead end. In order to make the issue operational, it would be
necessary to embark upon an in-depth situation of the actual state of the world. How
many countries are there which might be prepared to reject any control by the court? I
fear that the result would be something like this: The more likely a State is to be found
in violation of human rights by a WCHR, the less probably it is that it will comply with
its judgments.
¶ 70 My conclusion, for all these reasons—to my great regret—must be in the
negative. Realistically speaking, the creation of a world court for human rights is, at the
present time, neither desirable, nor necessary, nor probable. There are hardly any
arguments which would let us believe that such a court could contribute to peace and
security in the world today. What should, however, be pursued is a long-term
development which would bring the regions of the world onto the same level as Europe,
and to the extent that the parallel is justified, the Americas. Once a solid basis has been
established, it will be at least desirable to establish a world court which would secure
the uniform protection of human rights on the whole planet.
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